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1. Introduction  
 
At the end of the nineteenth century, Marshall (1890) explained that “a lowering of tariffs, or 
of freights for the transport of goods, tends to make each locality buy more largely from a 
distance what it requires; and thus tends to concentrate particular industries in special 
localities.” Indeed, during the industrial revolution, Marshall witnessed a key moment in the 
history of geography. As Bairoch (1989, 1997) explains, throughout the nineteenth century, 
transportation costs have been divided by ten, and at the very same time, inequalities between 
countries emerged: the standard deviation of GDP per capita in Europe has been multiplied by 
7.5. A very detailed analysis of this phenomenon is given by Lafourcade and Thisse (2011). 
The reduction of trade costs is one of the causes of these inequalities. 
 
In this paper, we distinguish between interregional and intraregional transportation costs. This 
allows assessing more precisely the effects of different transport policies on the regional 
distribution of activities. 
 
Even if Marshall had a good intuition of the relation between reduction of transportation costs 
and concentration of activities, the main contributions began to emerge in the 80’s. Three 
main models have been developed to study the effect of interregional trade on industrial 
location. The first one has been developed by Krugman (1980) (but it is usually called the 
Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model). He sets the basis of interregional trade in an imperfect 
competition framework with increasing returns to scale. He considers two sectors (agriculture 
and industry) that are both present in two regions. A manufactured good can be sold in the 
two regions, but to sell it “abroad”, a transportation cost must be paid by the consumer. The 
author concludes that a decrease of the transport costs will affect positively the two regions 
(by diminishing the price level in both regions). Nevertheless, the impact will be higher for 
the big region than for the small one, and so there will be an increase in inequalities between 
regions.  
This model has been further developed by Helpman and Krugman (1985). Consider 2 regions 
A and B, and 2 production factors: labor is homogenous and can be used either in the 
agricultural or the industrial sectors. Labor is immobile, whereas capital is mobile between the 
two regions. Each worker has a unit of capital he can invest either in region A or B. But the 
returns he gets from the capital are spent in his own region. Defining equilibrium as the 
equality of returns in the two regions, they managed to highlight what they referred to as  the 
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“Home-Market Effect”. This means that the share of industry in the employment of the central 
region is bigger than its share in the population. The reason is that, in presence of increasing 
returns and transportation costs, firms will prefer to locate near the biggest market. This effect 
will be even more intense when trade costs are reduced.  
 
The last main contribution is by Krugman (1991). He analyzes which workers move between 
regions, and how wages are set endogenously. Workers and firms move between regions 
comparing their expected utilities and profits. Krugman observes that, below a certain 
threshold, the reduction of transportation costs will automatically lead to the concentration of 
all the industrial activity in one of the two regions.  
 
These three models have two points in common: first, they all find that the reduction of 
interregional transportation costs will increase inequalities between regions. Second, they all 
use the same assumption: they consider regions as dots, without dimension, in which there are 
no intraregional transportation costs (see Behrens and Thisse, 2007). 
 
This last point is disturbing since a whole field of economics has focused on cities: urban 
economics. Many contributions have been made, but most of them were neglected by 
interregional trade economists. The first attempt to unify this field was the paper of Tabuchi 
(1998), in which the author proposes a synthesis of Alonso (1964) and Krugman (1991). 
Other papers have contributed to the linkage of these two growing fields. We can think of the 
paper by Puga (1999),where he observes that, with congestion costs, the “tomahawk curve” of 
Krugman (1991) becomes a bell-shaped curve The idea is that the congestion costs will 
reduce the incentive for firms to remain in the center when interregional trade costs are 
reduced. Cavailhès and al. (2006) go one step further and investigate the way the structure of 
cities is affected by interregional trade, shifting from a monocentric to a polycentric 
configuration to reduce congestion costs. 
 
However, all these contributions have neglected a very important scale: “the region”. As 
observe Behrens and Thisse (2007), these contributions have gone from the interregional scale 
to the urban one, skipping the region. We help filling this gap, making the difference between 
interregional and intraregional infrastructures. Such a distinction has already been made by 
Martin and Rogers (1995). They use this distinction to analyze FDIs (Foreign Direct 
Investments) in developing countries. They observe that an improvement of the international 
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infrastructure will motivate firms to move to developed countries, whereas an improvement of 
the regional infrastructure in the periphery will lead to a transfer of firms from the developed 
country to the developing one. We want to use such a distinction, between interregional and 
intraregional transportation costs, to assess more precisely the effects of different transport 
policies.  
 
There are several examples of the effects of infrastructure on regional inequalities. Vickerman 
(1991, 1999) has studied the effects of the European transport policy on regional inequalities. 
An historical example is provided by Cohen (2004). He explains that during the French 
colonization of Algeria, many roads were built to connect distant villages to central cities. 
These roads allowed firms from the center to sell their products to the villages. Far from 
improving the situation, these roads emptied the remote villages and increased the spatial 
polarization of activities.  
 
It is crucial   to understand the various mechanisms at stake, in order to implement a transport 
policy taking into account the cohesion objective. Another interesting objective is the 
normative study of such a situation. Indeed, is the geographical equilibrium an optimum from 
a Pareto point of view? Few contributions have focused on the normative point of view of the 
economic geography, and none of them made a distinction between interregional and 
intraregional transportation costs. 
 
This paper has two sections. In the first section, we start from an existing model of 
intraregional trade (the Helpman and Krugman’s one), and introduce intraregional 
transportation costs. With these intraregional costs, we can assess the effects of different 
transport policies on industrial location. In a second section, we take a normative point of 
view. We compare the spatial equilibrium to the Pareto optimal one. We show that the 
geographical equilibrium is not optimal. We next examine policies like road pricing that 
improve the efficiency of the equilibrium. A numerical example with transport policies for 
African countries illustrates the model. In a final part of the paper, we draw some conclusions 
from our model. Detailed mathematical proofs of the propositions are relegated in the 
appendixes.   
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2. A theoretical model to study the impact of interregional and intraregional 
transportation costs on industrial location 
 
2.1. Description of the model 
 
Most previous models in Economic Geography neglected the intraregional transportation 
costs. One of the exceptions is the model developed by Martin and Rogers (1995), in which 
they make a distinction between international and domestic trade costs. If their paper is a first 
step in the understanding of the impact of the intraregional trade costs, they do not use a 
normative framework: they do not look for efficiency improving policies. 
 
In this paper, we add to the Helpman and Krugman’s model (1985), intraregional 
transportation costs. The advantage of this model is that it has an analytical solution, what it is 
not the case of the Krugman (1991) model. Our reasoning is very close to the one proposed by 
Martin and Rogers (1995). We change the mathematical notations so as to obtain results more 
directly. 
 
We consider 2 regions: A (the center) and B (the periphery), where A has a bigger share of the 
population. In each region, there are two sub-regions: factories on one side and houses (with 
shops) on the other side.  
 
Figure 1. Structure of the regions and transportation costs 
 
 
The structure of these regions allows us to have intraregional as well as interregional 
transportation costs.  
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2.2. Main Assumptions 
 
Before solving the equilibrium, we need some assumptions. We consider a model of two 
regions: the center and the periphery. In the economy, there are L workers. A share   of the 
workers are in the central region, with 1/ 2  . In this model there are two kinds of factors: 
labor which is immobile and capital which is mobile, all members of the population own one 
unit of capital. As in Helpman and Krugman (1985), wages in the two regions are set to 1: 
1A Bw w  . 
 
More precisely, we define the different unit transportation costs within regions (AA, BB) and 
between regions (AB, BA). The intraregional transportation costs are given by AA  and BB , 
whereas interregional ones are given by  AB BA  . 
 
We suppose that the intraregional transportation costs are more important in the poor region 
(given the low quality of transport infrastructure) than in the rich region.  Moreover, we 
assume that interregional transportation costs are much higher than intraregional ones. We 
then have the following inequality: 
  .BA AB BB AA      
 
2.3. Equilibrium 
 
The objective of this model is to determine the value of  , which is the share of the industry 
located in the central region. As labor is immobile, intraregional commuting costs do not 
affect the location of production. We focus then on transportation costs. To obtain the value
we must first specify some elements concerning production and demand. 
 
2.3.1. Production 
The cost function of a firm is defined as      C q f r cq  , so that there are  increasing 
returns. Each firm needs f  units of capital and each of the L workers have a unit of capital. 
All firms have the same cost function and produce each a different variety. Denote by    the 
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share of the capital invested in A, Since capital is perfectly mobile between the two regions,  
the number of firms in  regions A and B are: 
(1) A
L
n
f

  and 
 1
B
L
n
f

 . 
 
Given we have assumed that the  capital is mobile, the spatial equilibrium is defined by the 
equalization of returns : 
      * * *A Br r r    . 
The returns are spent in the region of the owner. We obtain the value of the income of each 
region: 
(2)      1            1 1A BY r L and Y r L              . 
 
Without iceberg transportation cost, the profit equation for a representative firm i is given by 
    ( )i i i ip q p fr cq p    . Profit maximization leads to the equilibrium price 
1
1i
i
p c

 
  
 
, where i i
i
i i
q p
p q


 

. With the utility function defined in the Section 2.3.2, we 
have: i  , where   is the elasticity of substitution between varieties. 
 
Now, we introduce iceberg transportation costs as the percentage of the good that is lost 
because of transportation costs. If we want to receive a quantity q  of a product, it will be 
necessary to ship q  of the product, with 1  . We then infer the price lmp , paid by a 
consumer living in the region m, and purchasing  a product made in region l : 
(3)  
1
lm
lm lm i
c
p p
 


 

 where ,l A B  and ,m A B , 
where lm  represents the iceberg cost. 
 
2.3.2. Demand 
As in the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model, we have the following utility function: 1U M A   
where  , the part of the income spent on the composite good, is such that 1  . M is the 
composite good produced by the industry and A is the numeraire good. This numeraire good 
can be transported without cost between regions and every unit of labor that is not used to 
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produce the industrial goods can generate one unit of the numeraire good. This allows us to 
set the price of the numeraire good and the wage equal to 1 in both regions, as in Krugman’s 
model. The share of revenue dedicated to the composite good is mY , where mY  is the total 
income in region m. Maximizing ( ( ) )m lm lm iM Y q i p    L , we obtain the demand for a 
variety i, made in l  and consumed in m : 
(4)  
 
 1
( )   
lm i
lm m
lm jj
p
q i Y
p






 


,where  ,l A B  and ,m A B . 
In the rest of this model, we will use the notation: ( 1)   σlm lm τ . We observe that lm  takes a 
value between 0 and 1, if 1   . When  lm  is near 1, there are low barriers for trade.   
 
We add some assumptions on the values of   : 
(5)   AA BB AB BA       and 
(6) 1 AB
BB



  . 
The first hypothesis is just the transportation cost inequality written in terms of  . The second 
assumption will be justified soon, we need it to make sure the share of industry in the region 
belongs to [0,1]. In other words, this inequality means that interregional transportation costs 
must be much higher than the intraregional ones. This assumption seems reasonable.  
 
The total demand for the variety i produced in A is given by the sum of the demand for this 
variety by the region A and by the region B. The revenues in the equation (4) refer to the 
equation (2). Since the prices are given by the equation (3) and the number of firms by (1), we 
find: 
(7)  
    
 
   
 
1 1 11
.
1 1
AA A AB Bi
A
AA AB AB BB
r L r L
q
c L L L L
      

        
   
  
     
 
The first part is the demand for this variety from the consumers of the region A, whereas the 
second part is the demand from the consumers of region B 
 
2.3.3. Determining the equilibrium 
In the long term, the profits are just high enough to cover the cost of the capital. So the profit 
of the firm, producing the variety i, in the region A is: 
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(8)                * *Π 0A AA AA AB AB AA AA AB ABi p i q i p i q i c q i q i fr           
Let define the aggregate production as       A AA AA AB ABq i q i q i   . Then  we have:  
(9)  
( )
,
( 1)
A
A
cq i
r
f




 
which can, using the demand functions defined by the equation (7), also be written as: 
(10)  
  
 
   
 
1 1 1
.
1 1
AA A AB B
A
AA AB AB BB
r r
r
f
     

        
   
  
     
 
Symmetrically, we find ( )Br   : 
(11)  
  
 
   
 
1 1 1
.
1 1
AB A BB B
B
AA AB AB BB
r r
r
f
     

        
   
  
     
 
 
The spatial equilibrium is obtained when the returns in the two zones are the same. Therefore 
we are looking for the    value such that  Ar  and Br  are equal: 
 
 
 
   
 
 
1 1
 .
1 1 1 1
AB BBAA AB
AA AB AB BB AA AB AB BB
      
               
 
  
       
 
 
After simplifications, we find   (the share of industry in the central region): 
(12) 
  
,
   



AA AB AB BB
 
where     Ψ 1 BB AB AB AB AA BB            . 
 
Proposition 1: If the interregional transportation cost is sufficiently large, compared to the 
intraregional cost (  1   BB AB ), there exists a unique interior equilibrium where the 
industrial activity is shared between the two regions ( [0,1] ). If the interregional cost is too 
low (  1   BB AB  ), there is a corner solution  and all the industrial activity is in the center 
( 1  ). 
 
The proof of this proposition is relegated to Appendix 1. 
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2.4.Comparative statics 
 
One of the advantages of building our model on Helpman and Krugman (1985) is that we 
have an analytical solution for the equilibrium. This allows comparative statics. Indeed, we 
want to know the effects of improving the different types of infrastructure on the industrial 
location patterns. 
 
In this part, we modify the quality of a specific type of road and we evaluate its impact on the 
distribution of industrial activity. We assume that the funds (and resources) for the realization 
of this infrastructure are external. For instance, the funds could come from an international 
development agency (World Bank) or be part of a federal effort to help peripheral regions 
(Regional investment Fund in the EU). We show in Appendix 2 the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2: Both the improvement of the quality of interregional infrastructure and the 
reduction of intraregional transportation costs in the center lead to a higher concentration of 
industries in the center. However, lowering the peripheral intraregional transportation costs 
increases the attractiveness of the periphery for firms. 
 
Proposition 2 can be explained using the notion of market potential. As it was defined by 
Harris (1954), and then extended by Head and Mayer (2004), the market potential is like a 
weighted sum of the different potential sales on the national market and the surrounding 
markets where a firm would like to export its product. The weights are inversely proportional 
to the trade costs.  
 
Since the center is bigger than the periphery, it has naturally a higher market potential, which 
attracts firms. Reducing the interregional transportation costs will increase the market 
potential of the center, because central firms will have a better access to the periphery. 
Because of increasing returns, firms wish to move to the center. The reasoning is the same 
with intraregional transportation cost in the center. However, a decrease of the intraregional 
transportation cost in the periphery will increase the weight of the periphery in its market 
potential. The market potential of the periphery will then increase, and will consequently 
attract firms that will relocate from the center to the periphery. 
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3. Is this equilibrium efficient and can we improve it?  
 
In this section, we first look for the efficiency benchmark: what geographical distribution of 
industrial activity maximizes the sum of utilities in the two regions. The equilibrium we 
described in the previous section is then compared to the benchmark. Next we look for 
policies that could bring the equilibrium closer to the efficiency benchmark.  
 
3.1. Computation of the indirect utility functions in the two regions 
 
In order to maximize overall efficiency, we need an analytical expression for the utility in 
both regions. Recall that 1U M A   where 1  . Moreover, since A is the numeraire, then 
the  budget constraint reduces to: . 1P M A  . Substituting into the utility function, we 
obtain:    
11 .( )U M PM    
 
Maximizing the utility, with respect to M, and injecting the optimal value of M in the utility 
function, we obtain the indirect utility function:  
(13) 
 
 1
1
.V
P


 


  
Moreover, we know that maximizing V  is equivalent to maximizing any increasing 
transformation of V . We will then rely on the following indirect utilities in this section:  
(14)  and .A A B BV P V P
     
 
In the new economic geography literature, the price index in the region A is given by: 
(15) 
1
1( .)
1
A AA A AB B
c
P n n 

 


 

 
Using equation (1) for the number of firms, we obtain equation (16), which can be rewritten 
as equation (17).    
(16) 
1
1(1 )
,
1
A AA AB
c L L
P
f f
  
 


 
  
  
 
or 
(17)    ,1AA A ABKP

      
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where  
1
1
1
c L
K
f



 
  
  
  and 
1
.
1





 
We then have the indirect utility functions for an agent living in A ( AV ) and in B ( BV ) :  
(18) ( (1 )) .A AA ABV K
         
Similarly, we obtain:  
(19) ( (1 )) .B AB BBV K
         
   
3.2. Maximization of the total welfare in the economy 
 
We start by looking for the maximum of the unweighted sum of utilities in the two regions. 
There are two justifications for this. First one can allow for lump sum redistributive transfers 
by a federal government. Second one can see the maximization of utilities as the basis for an 
efficient bargaining between the two regions where the two regions share the gains of a better 
equilibrium via transfers among themselves.  
 
Since a share   of the population is in the center (and 1   in the periphery), the welfare 
function in the economy is then given by:  
  1 ,A BW V V     
          1 1   1 .AA AB AB BBW K K
           
                 
 
 
We look for the value o  that maximizes the welfare function: 
         max max  1 1  1 .AA AB AB BBW W  
 
         
                 
 
 
The first order condition gives us the following value: 
(20) ,o BB AB
BB AB AA AB
 

   


  
 
where 
  
 
1
1
.
1 BB AB
AA AB
  

  

  
  
  
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We can note that 1 1    , and as a consequence: [0,1]o  . The proof of these properties 
is relegated to Appendix 3. 
 
3.3. Comparison of the optimal and equilibrium values of the shares in industrial 
activity 
 
The question here is whether the concentration in the center is too high when the regulator 
doesn’t intervene. To answer this question, we must compare the equilibrium value Eq  and 
the optimal value o . Recall that: 
   ,Eq BB AB AB
BB AB AA AB
  

   

 
 
   
and that : 
 
   
.o BB AB
AA AB BB AB AA AB BB AB
 

         

 
     
 
  
After some calculations (see Appendix 5), it can be shown  that Eq o  . The results are 
summarized in: 
 
Proposition 3: At equilibrium, the spatial concentration of industrial activity in the center is 
too high compared to the first best optimum. 
 
That the spatial equilibrium leads to a higher concentration than the first best optimum can 
easily be understood. In fact, without any intervention, there is a kind of “snowball effect” 
(the expression was first used by Myrdal in 1957). For a given level of infrastructures, the 
center will attract firms. With these new firms, the market potential of the central region will 
increase, attracting more firms and so on… If nothing is done by the regulator, there will be a 
concentration of firms in the center that will be higher than the first-best optimum. 
 
What would become of Prop. 3 when one gives a higher weight to peripheral citizens and 
there would be no lump sum redistribution possible or no efficient bargaining between the 
two regions? In Appendix 4 it is shown that a higher weight to peripheral citizens decreases 
the value of the optimal share of industry in the center.. This is obvious since, giving a higher 
14 
 
importance to peripheral citizens, the concentration of firms in the center reduces the price 
index in the periphery. 
 
In order to improve total welfare, the concentration of firms in the center should be reduced. 
This means that the government must intervene so as to favor the transfer of firms from the 
center to the periphery.  
 
3.4. Policies to reach the optimal location : the role of road pricing 
 
In order to  decentralize the social optimum  o , we will use a set of incentives. In principle 
one could use different instruments; the regulator could tax the firms in the center and/or 
subsidize the firms in the periphery. Here, we focus on instruments that tax or subsidize the 
use of transport infrastructures. This can be understood as a form of road pricing or as a 
shadow cost used to compute the optimal size of different transport infrastructures. These 
incentives will allow us to match o  and Eq .  
 
The intuition is clear from the outset, we will have to tax the use of the interregional road, tax 
the use of the intraregional road in the center and/or subsidy the use of the intraregional road 
in the periphery. The question is then to know the precise value of these taxes or subsidies. 
 
3.4.1. Taxation of the use of the interregional road 
 
We want to tax the interregional infrastructure. This is equivalent to reducing the value of 
,AB  which is the “freeness of trade”. To do this, we will look for the value t  such that  
AB AB ABt    . We want to reach the value 
o , so we look for t , that solves :  
 
    
  )
.
1
(
AB AB ABBB AA BB
o
AB ABAA BB
       

   
   

 
 
 
After some calculations, and solving the polynomial function in AB , we find : 
(21)  
2
21 ( 1) (1 ) 4 ( )( 1)
2( 1)
o o o o o o
AB AA BB BB AA AA ABo
 
             
              
 
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Two remarks are in order: 
Remark 1: From AB , we can find the value of .ABt  
Remark 2: Reducing the value of AB  to AB t   is equivalent to increasing the iceberg cost 
from AB  to AB k  . The value of k  is then given by the following expression: 
  
1
1 .AB AB ABk t      
 
3.4.2. Taxation of the use of intraregional infrastructure in the center 
 
We want to tax the use of intraregional infrastructure in the center. This is equivalent to 
reducing the value of AA , which is the “freeness of trade”. To do this, we will look for the 
value t  such that  AA AA AAt    . We want to reach the value 
o , so we look for t , that 
solves:  
 
    
  
1
.
AABB AB AB AB BB
o
AA AB AB BB
       

   
   

 
 
 
After some calculations, and solving the polynomial function in AA , we find  
(22) 
(1 )( )
.
( )
BB AB AB
AA AB o
AB BB BB
   
 
   
 
 

 
And the above remarks become: 
Remark 1: From AA , we can deduct the value of .AAt  
Remark 2: Reducing the value of AA  to AA t   is equivalent to increasing the iceberg cost 
from AA  to AA k  . The value of k  is then given by the following expression: 
  
1
1 .AA AAk t      
 
3.4.3. Subsiding of the use of the intraregional road in the periphery 
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We want to subsidize the use of the intraregional infrastructure in the periphery. This is 
equivalent to increasing the value of BB , which is the “freeness of trade”. To do this, we will 
look for the value of the subsidy s  such that  .BBB BB Bs    
 
We want to reach the value o , so we look for 'BB , that solves:  
 
    
 
1
.
( )
BB BBAB AB AB AA
o
BBAA AB AB
       

   
   

 
 
 
After some calculations, we obtain:  
(23) 
2 (1 )
.
(1 ) ( )
o o
AA AB AB
o o
AB AA
BB
     
    

  

  
 
 
Remark 1 : From BB , we can deduct the value of BBs . 
Remark 2 : Increasing the value of BB  to BB s   is equivalent to reducing the iceberg cost 
from BB  to BB k  . The value of k  is then given by the following expression: 
  
1
1 .BB BB BBk s       
 
We have developed a set of incentives such that the equilibrium will be the optimal one. To 
do this, we focused on road pricing. One can reach the optimum in three different ways: 
taxing the use of the interregional infrastructure; taxing the use of the intraregional 
infrastructure in the center or subsidizing the use of the intraregional infrastructure in the 
periphery. Note that subsidizing the intraregional infrastructure in the periphery does not 
mean building a road. Indeed, the creation of the infrastructure is costly, while a subsidy is in 
principle a mere transfer of resources that corrects incentives and is not consuming real 
resources (except for the transaction costs). We illustrate our model below with a numerical 
example. 
 
3.4.4. A numerical example: Mozambique and Malawi 
 
In order to illustrate the mechanisms of the model, we take a numerical example. Since 
comprehensive data on interregional and intraregional transportation costs for road transport 
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are difficult to gather, we use from UNCTAD (2004). In their report, they calculate very 
accurate values for transportation costs in Africa. We take the example of two countries, 
instead of two regions. This choice is mainly due to the availability of data, but especially 
because it does not change anything concerning the assumptions and results. The two selected 
countries are Mozambique (the center) and Malawi (the periphery).  
 
First, we must calibrate our model. To do so, we match real data with the various parameters 
we use in the model. Table 1a displays values for the central country, whereas table 1b does it 
for the periphery. 
 
Table 1a. Numerical values for the parameters of Mozambique 
 
Region A – The core Mozambique 
 Population  19M 
Share of the population 
  
0.6 
Infrastructure quality 
index 
23.1 
AA  0.9 
 
 
Table 1b. Numerical value for the parameters of Malawi 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Region B – The Periphery Malawi 
Population 13M 
Share of the population 
1   
0.4 
Infrastructure quality index 20.4 
BB  0.79 
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Once these parameters have been calibrated, we must set the values of other parameters, that 
are not always known (for instance  ). Others, like the interregional transportation cost, can 
be found in UNCTAD (2004) . 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Other parameters to run the simulation 
 
Other parameters 
w wage 1 
  (elasticity of substitution) 6 
Share of transport cost in the price 
of goods sold in the other region 
22% 
Iceberg cost AB  1.28 
 AB  0.29 
   0.6 
 
Note that several values have been tested for the elasticity of substitution, and they do not 
change dramatically the results. We can now compute the spatial equilibrium and the spatial 
optimum. It is interesting to note that the simulated spatial equilibrium ( 0.75  ) is very 
close to the real value ( 0.74  ). 
 
Table 3. Spatial equilibrium and spatial optimum 
 
Spatial equilibrium and optimum 
Spatial equilibrium Eq  0.75 
Intermediate parameter   1.59 
Optimal concentration o  0.69 
 
As predicted by Proposition 3, there is a significant difference between the spatial equilibrium 
and the optimal concentration. The next step is to calculate the values of the different taxes or 
subsidies to reach the optimal concentration. 
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Table 4. Optimal taxes and subsidies on use of infrastructure to reach the optimum and 
their impact on the transportation costs 
 
Road pricing to reach the equilibrium 
Optimal AA  
Optimal tax AAt  
0.74 
0.16 
Optimal AB  
Optimal tax ABt  
0.20 
0.09 
Optimal BB  
Optimal subsidy BBs   
0.91 
0.12 
 
From these new values of transportation costs, we can deduct the impact on the product 
prices: 
 
Table 5. Impact of taxes on transportation costs 
 
Share of the transport cost in the price of a shipped 
product 
Before tax After tax 
Interregional 22% 27% 
Intraregional in the center 2% 6% 
Intraregional in the periphery 4% 2% 
 
This numerical example illustrates the different values predicted by our model. The values of 
the various taxes or subsidies are not unrealistic. These numerical  simulations confirm that 
the predictions of our model are in line with the theoretical results. At equilibrium, the 
concentration of activities in the center is too high and the use of interregional road taxes can 
restore the optimum.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
If a whole literature has studied the impact of transportation costs on the geographical 
distribution of activities, this paper is among the first to analyze the specific roles of 
interregional and intraregional transport costs . 
 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this paper. First, the improvements of the different 
categories (interregional/intraregional) of infrastructures have different effects on industrial 
location. We confirm Martin and Rogers (1995analysis: if the decision maker whishes to use 
the transport policy to reduce regional inequalities, then s/he must improve the quality of the 
peripheral intraregional infrastructure. The second conclusion follows from the normative 
analysis. Indeed, we show that the spatial equilibrium is far from being Pareto optimal. 
Without any intervention, the spatial equilibrium will lead to a concentration of firms in the 
center that is too high. The third result is that it is possible to use tax and subsidy instruments 
such as road pricing to reach the optimal share of firms in the center.  
 
Yet, this model could be improved in several ways. First, it was designed in such a way that 
interregional and intraregional transportation costs were independent. In reality, mattters are 
more complex and intraregional infrastructures may affect directly the interregional 
transportation costs. These network effects must be taken into account if we want a more 
realistic view of the effects of infrastructures on industrial location. Second, the introduction 
of congestion costs within regions would probably give interesting results. As it was 
explained by Lafourcade and Thisse (2011), congestion costs moderate the spatial 
polarization of activities. In our model, they would affect strongly the optimal taxes and 
subsidies. With these improvements, future research allows to understand more properly the 
dynamics of spatial activities. 
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Appendix 1. Proof of Proposition 1 
 
We want to prove that  1AB BB    , then [0,1]  
 
Proof of 0   
We know that:    0AA AB AB BB      . If 0  , then we must have Ψ 0 . Let’s prove it 
by contradiction. If Ψ 0 , then we have 
 
     Ψ 1 0BB AB AB AB AA BB              
      .1 BB AB AB AA AB BB             
Since 1      and BB AB AA AB       and since AB BB  , the previous line ca not be true. 
This means that Ψ 0 , and then 0  . 
 
Proof of 1   
We know that    0AA AB AB BB      . If 1  , then we must have : 
        1 BB AB AB AB AA BB AA AB AB BB                   
      1 0.BB AB AB AB AA BB AB BB                 
 
Since    1 0BB AB      and   0AB AA   , we must have 0BB AB BB      which is 
true if  1 .  .AB BB     
 
Proof that if  1AB BB    , then 1  
We know that:    0AA AB AB BB      . If 1  , then we must have: 
        1 BB AB AB AB AA BB AA AB AB BB                   
      .BB AB AA AB AA AB BB             
 
Since   1AB BB    , then   1AB BB      , so we have   
    ( ).BB AB AA AB BB AA AB           
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Moreover, we can note that:   AA AB AA AB       . So we can conclude that we have: 
    BB AB AA AB AA AB BB           , which means that if  1AB BB    , then 1   . 
 
Appendix 2. Proof of Proposition 2  
 
Impact of AB  : Improving the quality of the interregional infrastructure is like an increase in 
AB .  
 
 
     
  
2
1 2  Ψ[ 2 ]BB AB BB AA AB AB BB AA BB AB
AB AA AB AB BB
          
    
          
    
 
 
We have:  0 



 AB
λ
if the condition  2AA
AB



  is respected  (which always holds with our 
assumptions). Using this hypothesis, we observe that the improvement of the infrastructure 
between regions will strengthen the concentration in the center. 
 
Impact of  AA  : We measure the effects of an improvement of infrastructures in the center. 
We expect that it will lead to a higher concentration in the center. 
 
  
  
2
[ ]Ψ
 
BB AA AB AB BB AB BB
AA AA AB AB BB
      
    
    

    
 
 
We obtain:  0



 AA
λ
. As predicted, we conclude that the higher quality of infrastructure in 
the center will increase the concentration. 
 
Impact of BB  : Since the other actions on infrastructures have led to a higher concentration, 
we expect that the reduction of transport costs in the periphery will lead to a reduction of the 
concentration in the center. 
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      
  
2
1 [ ]ΨAB AB AA AA AB AB BB AA AB
BB AA AB AB BB
          
    
         
    
 
 
We find that 0



 BB
λ
 if we have  AB AA   (which holds with our hypotheses) .The better 
quality of infrastructure in the periphery will lead to a relocation of firms from the center to 
the periphery. 
 
Appendix 3. Remarks concerning the value of ζ  
 
First, we want to show that 0 1   
 
We can rewrite   as:  
 
  
 
1 1
1 1
.
1
ΩBB AB BB
AA AB AA
    

   
 
     
    
    
 
 
Since 0 Ω 1   and BB AA  , we can conclude than 0 1.    
 
Second, we want to show that 1    
 
Let’s prove it by contradiction. Then we make the hypothesis that 1    . 
So we must have: 
 
  
 
 
 
1 1
11 1
1
1
1  1 (1 )  
BB AB BB AB
AA AB AA AB
 

    
  
     
 
 

     
        
       
 
 
 
 
1
1 11
1 (1 ) .
AA AB
BB AB


  

 


 
    
  
 
 
Since 
1 1
1 1

  


  
  and since 0 1 1    then we have : 
1 1
1
1 1(1 ) (1 ) .  

     
 
We can then rewrite the inequality: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1
1 1
1(1 )  1  1 .
1
AA AB AA AB AA AB
BB AB BB AB BB AB


        
 
      


   
       
     
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And this is false. So by contradiction, we can say that 1  θ   
 
Third, with 1 1    , then we have [0,1]o   
 
We know that 1     . Since we have shown that   1 BB AB    ,  we now have: 
.BB AB   
 
This allows us to say that:  
 [0,1].
 
   

 
  
 o BB AB
BB AB AA AB
ζ
λ    
ζ ζ
 
 
Appendix 4. Impact of the weights on the optimal value of industry share 
 
We want to assess the impact of the weights in the total utility function on the optimal value 
of the industry share. To do this, we normalize the weight for region A to 1 and give a weight 
  to region B. This way, the indirect utility function to be maximized is then:  
  1A BW V V      
        max max  1 1  1AA AB AB BBWW  
 
          
                 
 
 
The first order condition gives us the following value: 
 ,
 
   


  
 o BB AB
BB AB AA AB
λ    
where 
  
 
1
11 BB AB
AA AB
   

  

  
  
  
. 
 
It is easy to show that 0





. Moreover, one can prove that 
 
0
o




 . Knowing the signs of 
these two derivatives, we can then conclude that an increase in   will lead to a reduction of 
 o . 
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Appendix 5. Proof of Proposition 3 
 
The spatial equilibrium is given by the value Eq : 
 
    
 
1
 
( )
BB AB AB AB AA BBEq
AA AB AB BB
       

   
   

 
 
 Eq BB AB AB
BB AB AA AB
  

   

 
 
. 
 
We want to compare Eq  with the optimal share of firms o  that can be rewritten as: 
 
( ) ( )
o BB AB
AA AB BB AB AA AB BB AB
 

         

 
     
 
 
First, we can compare the second parts of the two equations. Since   0BB AB     and 
0AB  , then we can observe that: 
 
( )
AB AB AB
AA AB AA AB BB AB
  
      
 

   
. 
 
Second, we want to compare the first parts of the equations. Let’s prove by contradiction that  
 
( )
BB BB
BB AB AA AB BB AB
 
      

   
 
 
To do so, we make the hypothesis that: 
  
( )
BB BB
BB AB AA AB BB AB
 
      

   
 
 
This would mean that :  
     AA AB BB AB BB AB                
      1 0AA AB BB AB             
 
 
 1 ( )
AA AB
BB AB
  

  

 
 
 
 1 .   
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This is a contradiction since we know that 0 1  . So this means that we have:  
 .
( )
BB BB
BB AB AA AB BB AB
 
      

   
 
 
These two inequalities lead us to the conclusion that: Eq oλ λ . 
 
